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Intervention operations in the foreign exchange market 
are used by the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru to 
manage both the level and volatility of their exchange 
rates. The Banco Central de Reserva del Peru provides 
information to the market about the specific hours of 
the day interventions would take place and the total 
amount of intervention. It consistently buys and sells on 
the foreign exchange market to avoid large appreciations 
and depreciations of the Peruvian nuevo sol against the 
U.S. dollar (Sol/USD), respectively. The estimates in this 
paper indicate that past information on interventions 
This paper is a product of the Emerging Global Trends Team, Development Economics Prospect Group. It is part of a 
larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
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has moved the sol in the intended direction but only 
during the time the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru 
has announced it would be active in the foreign exchange 
market. The authors also find that the expectation of 
future interventions by the Banco Central de Reserva del 
Peru decreases the volatility of the sol when it intervenes 
to avoid an appreciation of the sol; however, the opposite 
occurs when the intervention takes place to defend 
the sol from depreciation. Indeed, the sol has been less 
volatile during periods when the Banco Central de 
Reserva del Peru has intervened than otherwise. 
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Introduction 
Some central banks in emerging economies target the exchange rate level while others have 
other  aims:  to  slow  the  rate  of  change  of  the  exchange  rate;  to  dampen  exchange  rate 
volatility (in some cases to satisfy an inflation target); to supply liquidity to the forex market; 
or to influence the level of foreign reserves. Some other central banks have a mixture of 
objectives. See BIS (2005).  
The  Banco  Central  de  Reserva  del  Peru  (BCRP)  has  had  an  inflation  targeting 
framework for monetary policy since 2002. However, Peru is a dual-currency economy with 
predominant dollarization, and the BCRP, being aware of such conditions, cannot completely 
neglect how the exchange rate develops when designing and implementing monetary policy 
in Peru. The BRCP cannot increase further the inherent risks of the domestic currency, and 
instead promote the role of the currency as store of value and avoid excessive volatility to 
avoid  harmful  consequences.  High  volatility  of  the  sol/USD  could  have  effects  on  first, 
inflation given the degree of openness of Peru; second, international trade because the market 
for derivatives is not yet well developed in Peru (see Mundaca (2010)); and third, the balance 
sheets of the Peruvian private sector given the relatively highly dollarized of the economy. 
Therefore, the BCRP has as mandate to smooth out the path of the exchange rate and avoid 
high exchange rate volatility by intervening in the foreign exchange market.  
The  BCRP  is  also  taking  measures  to  promote  de-dollarization  in  its  inflation 
targeting regime, and it is now evident that financial dollarization has steadily decreased over 
recent years. For example, in 2004, 70% of credit to the private sector was denominated in 
foreign currency; by the end of 2009, this figure decreased to around 55% (deposits are more 
or less 50%). The measures that have been taken are using the interest rate (i.e., overnight    
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interest rates) as an operational target to stabilize and make predictable the relevant short-
term interest rates in the domestic currency. This practice should naturally contribute to the 
development of the yield curve of interest rates for different maturities for public debt in 
domestic currency. This will in turn foster incentives for issuing long-term instruments by the 
private sector that can be used to hedge against exchange rate risk and foreign exchange 
liquidity risks. In addition, the BCRP also requires that commercial banks have large reserves 
on their foreign currency liabilities. The implementation of these policies to de-dollarize the 
economy,  together  with  stronger  economic  fundamentals,  should  eventually  decrease  the 
need  to  both  intervene  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  over  time,  and  accumulate 
international reserves to carry out such interventions. Furthermore, there are risks involved in 
making the exchange rate into a nominal anchor for monetary policy and overriding the 
already institutionalized inflation targeting. The latter may cause shifts in expectations as the 
market becomes uncertain as to what the BCRP’s objectives really are. 
The goals of this paper are threefold: i) to briefly present a stochastic optimal control 
model for central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market similar to that presented 
in Mundaca and Oksendal (1998); (ii) to empirically test the predictions of our theoretical 
optimal control model by estimating the Central Bank of Peru’s (Banco Central de Reserva 
del Peru (BCRP)) reaction function for intervening in the foreign exchange market; and (iii) 
to  test  the  predictions  of  our  model  by  empirically  analyzing  the  effect  of  the  BCRP’s 
intervention policy on the exchange rate of the Peruvian currency, the sol, against the US 
dollar and its volatility.     
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This  paper’s  empirical  analysis  uses  intra-daily  exchange  rate  data  from  2004  to 
2009. Because the BCRP’s interventions are always made public at the end of its official 
participation in the foreign exchange market, we are able to differentiate between the effect 
of past information of interventions and expectations of future interventions on the exchange 
rate. This distinction is important because the whole purpose of making the information on 
intervention  activities  public  is  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  to  establish  that  the  BCRP  is 
committed to achieving certain goals. Moreover, we use the intervention decisions that are 
observed by the market to test the significance of the signaling channel (Mussa (1981)) of the 
intended monetary policies. Expected future and unannounced central bank participation in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  involves  a  good  deal  of  asymmetric  information;  as  a 
consequence,  uncertainty  may  or  may  not  dissipate  completely.  We  will  study  the 
significance of this uncertainty. 
The studies outlined in the relevant literature that examine the effect of central bank 
interventions on the volatility of the exchange rate have obtained mixed results. However, 
these  differences  are  mainly  attributable  to  the  varying  quality  of  the  data  used  in  the 
empirical  exercises,  as  well  as  the  monetary  policy  regimes,  data  frequencies,  and  the 
econometric methods used to measure the effects of interventions on the exchange rate. 
We  use  the  methodology  of  Mundaca  and  Oksendal  (1998)  to  model  an  optimal 
intervention policy for central banks to stabilize the exchange rate. Two types of controls are 
considered: discrete interventions, which cause a jump in the exchange, and continuous small 
interventions, with the purpose of smoothing variation in the exchange rate. The first control 
represents the infrequent but large interventions to prevent large variability due to random    
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events (i.e., political events), and the continuous control takes place to smooth out changes in 
the sol that inevitably result from adverse changes in economic fundamentals. As in Mundaca 
and Oksendal (1998), the range of variation of the exchange rate is determined endogenously 
from the optimal stochastic intervention control problem. 
We test our model of stochastic control empirically using intra-daily data. Even when 
the period within which the BCRP would intervene has been made public (between 11:00 
and 13:30 everyday), forward-looking market participants still remain uncertain as to if or 
when interventions will take place. This uncertainty occurs because on a daily basis, the 
market does not know how much appreciation/depreciation on one side and volatility on the 
other  side  the  BCRP  is  ready  to  tolerate.  The  market  needs  to  assess  the  probability  of 
intervention by the BCRP. Therefore, it should be not only interesting but also useful to 
analyze  the  effect  of  such  uncertainty  regarding  the  probability  of  intervening,  and  to 
compare it with the effect that past and public information on interventions may have on both 
the level and the volatility of the exchange rate itself. To carry out these tasks, our empirical 
model considers the unannounced future interventions as dichotomous, endogenous variables 
that both depend and affect the exchange rate. Modeling future interventions as endogenous 
is  realistic because market  participants make decisions  on the exchange rate, taking into 
account  their  beliefs  about  possible  central  bank  interventions  in  the  foreign  exchange 
markets. Finally, this study shows that the disturbances of the exchange rate mean equation 
are characterized not only by an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) process 
but  also  by  another  source  of  heteroscedasticity,  namely  their  correlation  with  the 
intervention variables. Accordingly, we allow expectations of central bank’s interventions 
enter as explanatory variables in the conditional mean and variance of the exchange rate.    
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model of the 
optimal control of the exchange rate. Section 3 includes a quick glance at the key aspects of 
foreign exchange intervention policies in Peru and a summary of the statistics of the main 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the empirical model that is used 
to  test  the  theoretical  model.  We  present  our  estimation  results  of  the  central  bank’s 
intervention and the conditional mean and variance of the exchange rate in Section 5. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
1.  A theoretical model for the optimal control of the exchange rate 
Using  the  theory  of  combined  stochastic  control,  we  model  the  monetary  authorities  as 
minimizing  the  total  costs  of  large  exchange  rate  deviation  from  certain  means  and  of 
intervening in the foreign exchange market with the purpose of stabilizing the exchange rate. 
Yt denotes the level of the exchange rate: sol/USD. The central bank aims to keep Yt stable 
and at least close to some average Y . To achieve its objective, it implements two types of 
control: 
i)  The  central  bank  can  intervene  frequently  with  small  amounts  of  foreign 
exchange to smooth the exchange rate’s movements. This type of control, m= 
(mt)tR,  is  called  continuous  control.  The  set  of  all  continuous  control  is 
denoted by U. 
ii)  The central  bank may intervene  in  the foreign exchange  market  forcefully 
selling or buying a large selected amount of foreign exchange, ξj, at discrete    
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and selected (stochastic) times, θj, to avoid drastic changes in the exchange 
rate. This type of intervention is represented by the double sequence:  
1 2 1 2 ( , ,..., ; , ,..., ) NN         .        (1) 
(1) is the impulse control in which N ≤ ∞, θk ≤ θk+1 and θk → ∞ as k → N (so 
that if N is finite, then θN = ∞). The set of all impulse controls is denoted by 
V. 
 
The pair w = (m,υ)  U × V is called a combined stochastic control. Large deviations 
of the exchange rate from its mean on a daily basis, are costly for the economy, but the 
central bank can apply the controls w = (m,υ) to stabilize the exchange rate and thus reduce 
these costs. Note, however, that it is  also costly for the central bank to implement such 
controls. Mohanty and Turner (2005) have documented the consequences of too frequent 
interventions. Consequently, the central bank in this paper will then implement such controls 
in an optimal manner. 
  Thus,  if  the  pair  w  =  (m,υ)  is  implemented,  the  exchange  rate  will  follow  the 
following stochastic process: 
0
: 0
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      ; or              (2.1) 
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( ) ( ) ( )
j
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t s t j
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
   
 
        .            (2.2) 
y0 is the initial value of sol/USD, Yt; ζ > 0 is a constant; b(ms) measures the effect of 
continuous interventions by the central bank, selling (m < 0) and buying (m > 0) foreign    
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currency,  on  the  exchange  rate;  while  γ(ξ)  denotes  the  effect  on  the  exchange  rate  of 
occasional interventions, buying (if ξ > 0) or selling (if ξ < 0). Bt(ω) for ω  Ω denotes 
Brownian motion. 
  Assume that the discount rate is ρ > 0 and that the cost of large deviations of the 
exchange rate from its mean is K(Yt –  Y ) for K(x) ≥ 0 for all x. Let R(m) be the cost of 
applying  the  continuous  control  (i.e.,  not  enough  economies  of  scale),  and  the  costs  of 
discrete interventions are denoted by L(ξj) > 0 (i.e., large sterilizations create conflicts with 
monetary policy). 
  Taking  into  consideration  the  above,  the  total  and  discounted  expected  cost  of 
applying the combined intervention control w is as follows: 
,
:













w s y t
tj
jT s
J s y E e K Y Y R m dt L e .    (3) 
T  ≤  ∞  is  a  given  (fixed)  future  time  and  E
s,y  denotes  expectations  with  respect  to  the 
probability law of Yt with initial value y and mean value Y . We also assume that the costs of 
selling foreign currency are not necessarily the same as those of buying foreign currency. 
  The  optimization  of  equation  (3)  determines  the  characteristics  of  the  stochastic 




                                                 
1 Further details can be found in Mundaca and Oksendal (1998).    
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2.  Key aspects of the foreign exchange intervention policies in Peru and statistical 
summary 
3.1 The Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP) and its intervention policies 
Peru attempts to follow a flexible exchange rate while adopting inflation targeting.  The 
BCRP determines, on a daily basis, the implicit band within which the sol is allowed to move 
against the US dollar. This implicit band is not publicly known, but the BCRP has made it 
clear  that  it  aims  to  minimize  excessive  volatility  of  the  sol.  According  to  Humala  and 
Rodriguez (2009), the BCRP intervenes to reduce excess volatility in the exchange market, 
but  in  recent  years,  interventions  also  have  concentrated  on  US  dollar  purchases.  Such 
interventions might indicate that Peru may sometimes prefer a depreciated sol against the US 
dollar,  at  least  when  depreciation  is  not  substantiated  by  economic  fundamentals.  As  an 
institutional issue, note that the BCRP has also made known that if it finds it necessary to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market on any day t, it will do so only between 11.00 am 
and 1:00 pm on that day. It is also known that decisions to intervene on day t are principally 
based on observing the sol at 11.00 am and how it has developed with respect to previous 
days. The public are informed about the total amount of intervention by the BCRP at 1:00 
pm. (Armas (2005)).  
 
3.2 Some general stylized facts and a summary of statistics 
This paper’s data have been obtained from the officials at the BCRP. General statistics of the 
relevant variables, including those used for the empirical work, are shown in Table 1. 
The last three rows in Table 1 show that the exchange rate is on average the least 
variable between 11.00 am and 1:00 pm on any particular day (represented by ∆Xt
13-11); it is    
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more variable during the other periods. Recall that the BCRP only intervenes between 11.00 
am and 1:00 pm and that this is known by the market.  
 
Table 1. Summary of statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Series                   Obs         Mean      Std. Deviation    Minimum      Maximum 
Net Interventions    1483     14.5945        60.2236      -443.8000            478.7000 
 
Accumulated Interventions  
in the last 4 days: 
4days
t X   1484     58.5201      194.8345      -1277.0000          1626.4000 
 
Bid price at 1100                        1483      3.1726          0.1912            2.4950        3.5055 
Ask price at 1100             1483        3.1745          0.1902            2.6920        3.5075 
(bid+ask)/2 at 1100:Yt
11            1483        3.1735          0.1906            2.6915        3.5065 
Bid price at 1330             1483        3.1721          0.1913            2.4950        3.5035 
Ask price at 1330             1483        3.1748          0.1897            2.6940        3.5075 
(bid+ask)/2 at 1330:Yt
13            1483      3.1735          0.1904            2.6935        3.5055 












13-13  1483   -0.0122            0.4489             -7.6205          8.1977 
   
Such statistics indicate that the Peruvian sol seems to be less volatile during periods 
when the BCRP can officially participate in the foreign exchange market. The BCRP has 
informed the public that regardless of how the exchange rate moves, it does not participate at 
other times of the day, i.e. between day t at 11.00 am and day t-1 at 1:00 pm (represented by 
∆Xt
11-13). However, the time interval in which the central bank can be both present and absent 
is between 1:00 pm at day t and 1:00 pm at day t-1 (represented by ∆Xt
13-13).    
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The  following  figures  show  the  average  between  the  bid  and  ask  prices  for  the 
sol/USD observed at 11.00 am (Figure 1) and the percentage change in the exchange rate at 
different times of the day represented by the difference in the logs of the exchange rate 
(Figures 2 and 3). Figure 2 shows the differences between the logs of the average bid and ask 
prices observed at 11.00 am at day t and the logs of the average bid and ask prices observed 
at 1:00 pm at day t-1. ∆Xt
11-13 is the only period in which it is known that the BCRP can be active in 
the forex. Figure 3, however, shows the difference between the logs of the average bid and ask 
prices observed at 1:00 pm on day t and the logs of the average bid and ask prices observed 
at 11.00 pm on day t, ∆Xt
13-11, the period in which the central bank is absent in the forex. The 
development of the (100 times) log difference of the bid and ask at 11.00 am is displayed in 
Figure 4. Each of the figures also includes the patterns of the net interventions by the BCRP 
in millions of USD. Net positive interventions indicate net buying of foreign reserves by the 
BCRP, and negative interventions indicate net selling of foreign reserves.  
Figure 1. Sol/USD observed at 11.00 am         Figure 2. Changes in logs of Sol/USD 
and Net Interventions by BCRP            and Net Interventions by BCRP: ∆Xt
11-13 
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Figure 3. Changes in logs of Sol/USD  Figure 4. Bid-Ask Spread in the  
and Net Interventions by BCRP: ∆Xt
13-11  Interbank Rate and Net Interventions 
by BCRP 
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Figures 1, 2, and 3 suggest that the BCRP decisions to intervene target both the levels 
and the changes in the sol/USD. Regarding spreads, it is not clear from Figure 4 whether the 
BCRP responds to large spreads and makes any attempt to avoid them, but we test for that 
possibility. 
Notice  that  Figures  2  and  3  confirm  the  results  of  the  sample  statistics  on  the 
percentage  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  measured  during  times  when  the  BCRP  has 
announced that it can intervene and times when the BCRP has indicated it will not intervene 
in the forex. Notice that during the period between August 2008 (observation 4200) and 
December 2008 (observation 4300), the sol experienced a rapid depreciation and the highest 
volatility within the period of study. Nevertheless, the volatility was always smaller between 
11.00  am  and  1:00  pm  on  any  specific  day.  We  next  need  to  determine  whether  such 
distinction is due to the BCRP’s intervention policy. How is the behavior of the participants 
in the exchange rate market affected by BCRP announcing that it will participate and by how 
much (at the end of its intervention activities)? How do market expectations regarding future    
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intervention affect the exchange rate level and its volatility? We attempt to answer these 
questions in the following sections. 
 
3.  An empirical model for the sol/USD rate 
We  test  our  theoretical  model  first  estimating  the  central  bank’s  reaction  function  for 
intervening; and second, by estimating the conditional mean and variance of the sol/USD 
rate. The variance is assumed to follow the Exponential GARCH (1,1) process identified by 
Nelson  (1991)  (EGARCH(1,1)). Expected central  bank intervention decisions  entering in 
both the conditional mean and variance, are assumed to be endogenously determined. Past 
information on intervention is also analyzed. The empirical analysis here is an extension of 
Mundaca’s (2001) econometric methodology. 
 
4.1 Reaction functions of the Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (BCRP) for intervening 
This section presents an empirical adaptation of the combined stochastic control, the pair w = 
(m,υ)  presented  in  Section  2,  which  embodies  the  central  bank’s  optimal  decisions  to 
intervene to smooth the movements of the exchange rate: large and infrequent interventions 
and continuous interventions in the foreign exchange market. Such optimal decisions should 
minimize the central bank’s costs.  
Consider M
B and M
S the variables representing the central bank participation buying 
and  selling  foreign  exchange,  respectively.  These  decisions  to  intervene  are  defined  as 
follows: 
11 4
11 1 12 1 13 1 ()
B days B
t t t t t t M apprec X X Spread             .            (4.1)    
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11 4
21 1 22 1 23 1 ()
S days S
t t t t t t M deprec X X Spread             .                (4.2) 
 
  The exchange rate used here is the (log) of the average between the bid and ask prices 
observed at 11.00 am, Xt
11. Recall that it is public information that the central bank makes 
decisions after analyzing how the exchange rate has developed until 11.00 am on the day it is 
evaluating  whether  to  intervene  or  not.  The  variables  apprec  and  deprec  represent  only 
appreciation and depreciation of the sol with respect to the US dollar between today at 11:00 
am and the day before at 1:00 pm (the last time that the central bank could have intervened). 
Thus, the parameters δ11 and δ21 will indicate whether the central bank only buys foreign 




t X   is the log of the 
average change in the sol/USD over the last 4 days observed at 11:00 am. The spread is (100 
times) the difference in  logs of the bid and  ask prices observed at t-1. We consider the 
possibility that the central bank may be interested in correcting sufficiently large spreads by 
intervening to alleviate lack of liquidity. 
The market (and the econometrician) does not know the precise timing for  future 
central  bank  interventions,  and  they  consequently  needs  to  form  expectations  about  the 
central  bank  participation  in  the  forex  market.  In  view  of  this,  we  model  intervention 
decisions, M
B and M
S, as qualitative variables. M
B and M
S are greater than zero if the central 
bank intervenes and zero otherwise. We define the dummy variables I
B and I
S, which are 
going to be related to M
B and M
S in the following manner: 
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It





        It




B = 0                 (5)
        It




S > 0 
        It




S = 0.   
 
Also,  δ
B  =  (δ11,  δ12,  δ13);  δ
S  =  (δ21,  δ22,  δ23);  and  Zt
B  and  Zt
S  are  matrices  of 
explanatory  variables  accompanying  the  δ’s  of  the  decisions  to  intervene  as  defined  in 
equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
We  use  the  probit  ML  to  estimate  the  parameters  in  (4.1)  and  (4.2),  taking  into 
account (5) and using intra-daily data for the sol/USD between 2004 and 2009. Now, μt
B and 
μt
S are random disturbances with the following distributions: 
      μt
B ~ N(0,1); μt
S ~ N(0,1); and cov(μt
Bμt
S) = 0. 
 
4.2 Empirical specification of the model for the exchange rate 
Estimation  of  the  model  containing  equations  (2)  and  (3)  requires  identification  and 
estimation of their parameters. Note that the central bank is assumed to minimize the cost of 
intervening, which implies minimization of K(Yt –  Y ), R(m), and  L(ξj) > 0. Once this 
minimization is achieved, the exchange rate is expected to evolve as described in (2). We 
need to determine an econometric specification to estimated parameters of equation (2). Let 
us consider a possible econometric specification for the conditional mean of sol/USD: 
  t t t t E X W    .          (6)    
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Et+1[ΔXt] is the expected change in the exchange rate. Wt includes lags of  t X  and central 
bank  interventions  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  both  past  and  expected  future 
interventions. 
As mentioned above, the BCRP does not intervene on any day earlier than 11.00 am or 
later than 1:00 pm. This is common knowledge to the market, and the BCRP announces the 
total  amount  of  its  intervention  each  day  after  finishing  its  participation  in  the  foreign 
exchange market at 1:00 pm. Nevertheless, on any particular day, participants in the market 
(and the econometrician) are unable to know the exact timing of past and future possible 
interventions. Note that receipt of a signal is not the same as a materialized intervention. The 
actual time and amount of intervention occurring during the day are never made public.  
Our specified equation (6) emphasizes the simultaneous determination of the expected 
exchange rate and these expected future interventions. We designed our empirical model to 
capture this simultaneity as accurately as possible. In this regard, we consider that the BCRP 
makes decisions about whether to intervene or not every day at around 11.00 am. We also 
consider that at the same time, market participants form expectations about both possible 
central bank interventions and the future exchange rate at different time periods in a specific 
day. With regard to the expectations of the market participants, the following strategies are 
adopted: 
 
  Strategy 1: We consider how the market forms expectations about a possible exchange 
rate  change  between  1:00  pm  the  previous  day  (which  is  the  time  when  the  BCRP 
publishes  its  intervention  activities  and  the  last  exchange  rate  observation  the    
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econometrician has available in any particular day) to 11.00 am today. Keep in mind that 
during  this  period,  the  BCRP  has  committed  to  not  intervene  at  all  in  the  foreign 
exchange market. 
  Strategy 2: We consider how the market forms expectations about a possible exchange 
rate change between 11.00 am and 13.30 pm on the same day. 
  
Strategy 1 truly and solely represents how potential central bank interventions in the 
permitted  time  frame  affect  the  formation  of  market  expectations  on  the  exchange  rate. 
Strategy 2 allows us to capture partly the effect of signals on actual interventions and partly 
the effect of expectations that interventions might take place between 11.00 am and 1:00 pm. 
Note that even though the BCRP does not publicize its intervention activities until 1:00 pm 
every day, the market might receive some signals as to whether the BCRP is present in the 
forex between 11.00 am and 1:00 pm and yet an actual intervention might not materialize. 
Thus, the two strategies comprise a period when the BCRP has announced it will intervene 
and a period when the BCRP has committed to not intervene at all. 
Now, following the arguments presented above and bearing in mind that independent of 
what assumptions we make about the disturbance εt, equation (6) alone cannot represent the 
correct process for the exchange rate because future expected central bank interventions are 
endogenous. Here, we hypothesize that future central bank decisions to intervene affect the 
exchange rate, and such decisions depend on the exchange rate itself. To obtain consistent 
estimates, one must therefore consider that the disturbance εt is correlated with these future 
intervention  decision  variables.  More  specifically,  the  error  terms  of  the  central  bank’s 
reaction functions for intervening, μt
B and μt
S will be correlated with εt. Thus, the estimation    
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method needs to take into account (4.1), (4.2) and (5) together with (6). Taken together, these 
equations constitute an endogenous switching regression model for the exchange rate where 
the switch is defined by the criteria functions (4.1), (4.2) and (5) (see Johnson and Kotz 
(1972), Olsen (1980) and Mundaca (2001) for further details). That is  
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In (7), Ωt-1 represents all information available up to time t-1. We consider different AR 









S) are the truncated means  of Et[μt
B|μt







S], respectively, and they represent the conditional distributions of 
Mt
B  and  Mt
S.  More  intuitively,  the  hazard  functions  represent  the  rates  at  which  the 
intervention spells are completed in a specific day, given that they took place that day. We 
include information on interventions, Intervt-1, which are common knowledge to the market 
on the day and time that the BCRP decides whether to intervene or not. The disturbance of 
the mean equation (7), for example, ηt, is assumed to have zero mean and certain conditional 
variance. This variance is assumed to follow an Exponential GARCH(1,1) (EGARCH(1,1)) 
process which was introduced by Nelson (1991), but it also includes the effect of central    
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banking interventions: both past interventions observed by the market and the squares of the 
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The EGARCH models are motivated by evidence that large negative shocks have a 
larger  effect  on  volatility  than  corresponding  large  positive  shocks.  Historical  volatility 
measures, including GARCH models, do not capture this asymmetry. Another advantage of 
the EGARCH model is that there is no need to artificially impose non-negativity constraints 
on the model parameters. This is made possible because for the conditional variance, one 
models log(ζ
2). Note that we also assume an EGARCH(1,1) process for the exchange rate, 
assuming t-distribution for the error terms to account for the leptokurtosis of the exchange 
rate. 
The strategy to estimate (4.1), (4.2), (5), (7) and (8) consists of a two-stage method 
suggested by Heckman (1978) and Lee (1978). In the first step, we estimated (4.1) and (4.2) 
with observations I
B and I









S). In the second step, equations (7) and (8) 
are  estimated  by  numerically  maximizing  the  likelihood  function  for  the  EGARCH(1,1) 
model.    
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Again, by specifying the logarithm of the variance ht as a function of  ηt, Nelson 
ensured that the conditional variance stays positive even if some of the coefficients in (8) are 
negative. Introducing  11 /   tt h  permits us to analyze whether positive or negative values 
of ηt will increase or decrease the conditional variance. 
 
4.  Estimation results 
5.1 The intervention equations 
We  estimate  the  parameters  of  the  intervention  criteria,  equations  (4.1)  and  (4.2),  with 
observations It
B and It
S as a standard probit model. These estimates are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Probit estimates of the criteria functions for intervening.  
(Standard errors are in parentheses.) 
 
Dependent Variable Mt
B                   Dependent Variable Mt
S 
 
Coefficients    Estimates             Coefficients           Estimates 
       δ11               0.3810      δ21      -1.1235     
      (0.0633)            (0.0821) 
       δ12             -0.3855      δ22      1.0463   
      (0.0769)            (0.0817) 
       δ13            -8.0346      δ23      -4.8294 
         (0.5882)            (0.3789) 
 
Observations     1469                 1469 
Log Likelihood          -879.26             -647.79 
 
The results indicate that the central bank seems to be consequent in its intervention 
decisions. That is, the probability of intervening buying (selling) foreign currency increases 
when the exchange rate observed at 11.00 am (ask price) at time t appreciates (depreciates)    
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with respect to its value the day before (at t-1), also observed at 11.00 am.
2 The behavior of 
the exchange rate during the preceding 4 days is also important to the intervention decisions 
of the BCRP. For example, if the sol appreciates with respect to the average exchange rate in 
the preceding 4 days, the probability of intervening  by buying foreign currency increases. 
This probability is reduced, however, if the sol depreciates. Similarly, it is m ore likely that 
the BCRP will sell foreign currency if the sol depreciates with respect to the previous 4 last 
days.  
Regarding the spread, we find that a widening of the bid-ask spread reduces both the 
probabilities of selling and buying foreign currency. As we know, the bid-ask spread is an 
important part of transactions costs for international trade and investment. A widening of this 
spread decreases a firm’s profit and thus discourages it from engaging in international trade 
or investment. It is therefore surprising that the BCRP does not seem to be addressing its 
intervention policy toward reducing the spread. 
  In conclusion, the BCRP appears to have a consistent intervention policy in the sense 
that it avoids large variations of the exchange rate while allowing a smoothing of changes in 
the exchange rate on a daily basis. The BCRP seeks to avoid large and quick appreciations 
and depreciations of the sol by buying and selling foreign currency, respectively. We have 
yet to test whether such a well intended intervention policy actually decreases the volatility 
of the sol against the USD and moves the sol in the desirable direction. 
 
                                                 
2 Other times were also considered but never resulted in significant parameters.    
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5.2 The effect of interventions on the exchange rate 
We will now present and explain the estimates of our EGARCH model, in which we make 
the conditional mean (equation (7)) and the conditional variance (equation (8)) depend on the 
interventions decisions by the BCRP. The estimates are shown in Table 3, and those in bold 
are at least significant at the 5% level. Notably, our results do not support the random walk 
hypothesis because the autoregressive parameters and the expected interventions and/or past 
information on interventions affect future changes in the conditional mean of the exchange 
rate. The empirical results can be summarized as follows: 
 
(a) Common knowledge past interventions (previous day) seem to have a desirable effect on 
the expected change in the exchange rate, but only between 11.00 am and 1:00 pm on the 
same day (∆Xt
13-11), the period when the BCRP has committed to intervene if necessary 
and optimal. However, during the time interval when the BCRP is totally absent in the 
forex  market,  there  are  undesirable  effects  on  the  expected  exchange  rate  changes 
between 11.00 am today and 1:00 pm the day before (∆Xt
11-13). For example, the previous 
day’s interventions of selling (buying) foreign currency seem to have further depreciated 
(appreciated)  the  sol  during  those  times.  This  result  could  mean  that  information 
regarding past interventions can only successfully affect market expectations in the right 
direction and remind market participants that the central bank is committed to avoid large 
variations of the sol between 11.00 am and 1:00 pm.
3 
                                                 
3 We also considered accumulated intervention over 5 and 6 days; the results remained qualitative unchanged.     
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Table 3. Estimated parameters of the conditional mean and variance for the sol/USD. 
(Standard errors are in parentheses) 
 
Explanatory Variables    Effect on ∆Xt
11-13  Effect on ∆Xt
13-11 
MEAN EQUATION 
β1           0.0986     -0.0184     
          (0.0245)    (0.0141)     
β2          0.1246     0.0414      
          (0.0225)    (0.0172)     
 
α          -0.15810
-3    0.16810
-3     
          (0.34910
-4    (0.47210
-4)     
 
B             0.0332     0.0030      
          (0.0038)    (0.0058)     
S             -0.0330    0.0023      
          (0.0029)    (0.0040)     
 
VARIANCE EQUATION 
c          -0.4390    -0.4055     
          (0.0495)    (0.0661)     
 
a1          0.7391     0.5152      
          (0.1801)    (0.0775)     
 
κ          0.1080     0.0043      
          (0.0431)    (0.0356)     
 
b1          0.9675     0.9686      
          (0.0077)    (0.0100)     
 
ρB          -0.0103    0.0023      
          (0.0045)    (0.0056)     
 
ρS          0.0193     -0.0036     
          (0.0072)    (0.0091)     
 
          0.48210
-3    0.20410
-3     
          (0.35210
-3)    (0.32710
-3)     
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(b) Expectations  about  future  central  bank  interventions  in  spite  of  public  information 
regarding previous interventions do not have desirable effects or have no effect at all on 
expected future exchange rates. On one hand, we find that market expectations about 
future central bank participation by selling (buying) foreign currency causes additional 
depreciation (appreciation) of the sol during the time period when the BCRP does not 
participate  in  the  forex.  Here,  we  refer  to  the  effect  on  ∆Xt
11-13.  On  the  other  hand, 
expected changes in the exchange rate between 11.00 am today and 1:00 pm on the same 
day (∆Xt
13-11) appear to be independent of probabilities (as represented by the hazard 
functions) that the BCRP might become active in the forex during that time. As explained 
above, the market only seems to care what the BCRP has done in the past when it forms 
expectations on the exchange rate in a particular day only between 11:00 am and 1:00 
pm. It is only during such period that there will be desirable effects on the expected 
exchange rate. During other times of the day, there are other factors more than potential 
future expectations that drive market expectations. The market may not believe in the 
effectiveness of future interventions, even when there is a high probability that they will 
take place.  
 
(c) Regarding  the  effects  on  the  conditional  variance,  we  find  that  past  information  on 
interventions has no effect on the conditional variance of the expected changes in the 
exchange  rates  at  the  different  time  intervals,  which  are  on  ∆Xt
13-11  and  ∆Xt
11-13. 
Probabilities of future central bank interventions (as represented by the hazard functions) 
have no effect on variance of the expected changes of the exchange rate within one day 
(∆Xt
13-11), even when this is the period in which the BCRP can intervene. However, for    
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exchange rate changes between today and yesterday (∆Xt
11-13), a higher probability that 
the  BCRP  will  intervene  in  the  future  by  buying  foreign  currency  to  avoid  drastic 
appreciation of the sol against the USD decreases the volatility of the sol. In contrast, an 
expectation of higher participation by the central bank to defend the sol against the USD, 
or  strong  sol  depreciation,  causes  higher  volatility  of  the  expected  changes  in  the 
exchange rate (again on ∆Xt
11-13). This effect is almost twice as strong as the effect of 
buying foreign currency to avoid appreciation of the sol. These results might explain why 
the statistical standard deviation of the expected changes in the exchange rate within one 
day seem to be smaller than the expected changes in the exchange rate between today and 
the previous day. The latter period coincides with the periods in which the central bank 
participation in the forex is not expected.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 show the conditional standard deviation of the change in the log of the 
Sol/USD, ∆Xt
11-13 and ∆Xt
13-11, respectively, together with the net interventions. 
 
Figure 5. EGARCH(1,1) Conditional          Figure 6. EGARCH(1,1) Conditional 
      Standard Deviation of ∆Xt
11-13       Standard Deviation of ∆Xt
13-11 
      and net BCRP interventions        and net BCRP interventions 
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Note that between August 2008 and December 2008 (between the 4200 observation and 
the 4300 observation), at the worst period of the recent financial crisis, the sol depreciated a 
great deal and there were large numbers of interventions by selling USD, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. During the same period, the changes in the sol/USD (Figure 2) and its conditional 
standard deviation (Figure 5) were very large, especially during the time the BCRP did not 
intervene  at  all:  between  11.00  am  today  and  1:00  pm  the  day  before.  This  result  is  in 
contrast to the amount of volatility during the time the BCRP can intervene, between 11.00 
am and 1:00 pm on any given day (see Figure 3 and Figure 6). We can then conclude that 
larger variations of the sol will most likely occur during those times when the sol depreciates 
and the BCRP does not intervene. 
 
(d) We also found evidence of asymmetric effects of the shocks on conditional volatility. For 
example, if one considers the period during which the BCRP does not intervene, for 
given ht-1, a shock causing one-unit decline in εt-1 (e.g., an appreciation in the sol) induces 
a  change  in  the  log  of  conditional  variance  by  –  0.6311  units  (=  (0.7391)*(-1)  + 
(0.1080)*(|-1|)), which implies a decrease in the conditional variance. Furthermore, for a 
given ht-1, if a shock gives a rise in εt-1 by one unit (e.g., a 1% depreciation of the sol), 
there will be an increase in the (log) conditional volatility by 0.8471 units (= (0.7391)*(1) 
+ (0.1080)*(|1|)). However, during the time frame in which the BCRP does intervene, the 
effects on exogeneous shocks on the variance are smaller than they are during the period 
the  BCRP  is  not  active.  That  is,  for  given  ht-1,  a  one-unit  decline  in  εt-1  (e.g.  a  1% 
appreciation of the sol) induces a change in the log of conditional variance by – 0.5109 
units  (=  (0.5152)*(-1)  +  (0.0043)*(|-1|)),  which  implies  a  decrease  in  the  conditional    
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variance. Furthermore, for given ht-1, if εt-1 rises by one unit (e.g., a 1% depreciation of 
the  sol),  it  causes  an  increase  in  the  (log)  conditional  volatility  by  0.5195  units  (= 
(0.5152)*(1)  +  (0.0043)*(|1|)).  Thus,  if  one  considers  the  crisis  of  2008  as  a 
“depreciation” shock to the sol/USD, an increase in εt-1, because there was a shortage of 
US dollars worldwide and most currencies in both the developed and developing world 
depreciated, then one can conclude that any increase in sol volatility must have been due 
to the effect of such crisis. It must have been difficult for the BCRP to decrease the sol 
volatility caused by the worldwide effect of the 2008 crisis, as our results indicate. Not 
even past information on central bank interventions that became common knowledge to 
the public dissipated the uncertainty in the market.  
 
In sum, we have shown that the BCRP’s intervention policy is consistent in buying USD 
when the sol appreciates and selling USD when the sol depreciates. We also find that public 
information about past interventions has been effective in moving the sol in the intended 
direction. However, this information seems to have had these effects only during times when 
the  BCRP  has  informed  the  market  that  it  will  intervene  and  when  interventions  were 
considered necessary and optimal. Thus, both public information about interventions and the 
BCRP’s determination to intervene in an optimal manner have been useful in moving the sol 
in the desired direction during times of BCRP forex interventions. However, the market does 
not seem to be affected by past BCRP intervention policy when forming expectations about 
the exchange rate during times when the BCRP is absent from the forex. Overall, the BCRP 
does  not  yet  seem  to  have  established  a  sufficiently  strong  reputation  such  that  market 
participants can predict the BCRP’s future participation in the forex. Moreover, expectations    
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formed during times when the BCRP is absent from the forex appear to increase the volatility 
of the sol when this currency is on a depreciating trend.  
It is quite possible that the BCRP may need additional time, relative to the time period 
covered by the data available here, to establish the desired reputation. A crucial question 
remains as to whether there is any gain for the BCRP in maintaining a “low volatility” sol 
only during a certain (relatively short) period each day. Note that we are not suggesting that 
the BCRP should necessarily intervene much more extensively and frequently; this type of 
action can be very costly in terms of foreign exchange reserves, which can be used optimally 
for other purposes. The Peruvian monetary authorities should carefully evaluate the costs and 
benefits of intervening in the forex given their success in maintaining inflation targeting and 
a  relatively  open  capital  market.  In  the  meantime,  it  would  be  advisable  for  Peruvian 
policymakers to concentrate on reforming their financial markets and developing financial 
instruments that will permit hedging against exchange rate risks and reduce the degree of 
dollarization of the Peruvian economy. As long as the degree of dollarization remains high, 
policymakers will argue that it is important for them to intervene in order to reduce the 
volatility of the sol relative to the dollar, especially to avoid a significant appreciation of the 
sol (because this tends to erode the value of the country’s dollar asset holdings). It will be 
important to free the Peruvian economy from this straitjacket. 
Our  results  present  some  support  for  the  “signaling  channel”  effect  of  interventions 
(Mussa (1981)), which means that by making past intervention activities public, the BCRP 
transmits information about its exchange rate objectives. This policy appears to be able to 
move the sol in the desired direction, but it can do so only during times when the BCRP 
participates in the forex. Such information gives the BCRP some assurance that its intentions    
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are being fulfilled: that it will participate in the forex during the hours it has committed to do 
so.  However,  past  information  apparently  has  created  some  uncertainty  about  future 
movements of the sol, and this has not been helpful for the BCRP in its attempts to establish 
policy credibility.  
Finally, and importantly, it is also possible that interventions magnify rather than dampen 
the  effects  of  shocks  to  the  sol/USD  exchange  rate,  especially  for  shocks  that  cause  a 
depreciation of the sol against the USD. A final recommendation from the above results is 
that the BCRP should also address the problem of large bid-ask spreads. Further research 
should investigate whether interventions affect the bid-ask spread and whether the volatility 
of the exchange rate affects this spread. Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) hypothesize that 
interventions create significant adverse selection problems for dealers. They find that dealers 
increase exchange rate spreads around the time of interventions and suggest that in doing so, 
dealers protect themselves against the greater information asymmetry of such circumstances. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We have considered how interventions affect the process for the exchange rate of sol/USD, 
both its conditional mean and variance. Expected future participation of the BCRP in the 
foreign exchange market has been modeled as endogenous, a subject that is rarely taken into 
account in the relevant literature. We think that our methodology is useful when modeling 
central bank interventions in the forex. 
Regarding the reaction function for intervening, we found that the BCRP consistently 
attempts to move market expectations in the correct direction by buying and selling foreign 
exchange currency to prevent drastic appreciation or depreciation of the sol against the USD.     
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We have considered the formation of market expectations about the exchange rate 
during  different  times  of  the  day.  We  specifically  considered  expectations  regarding 
formation of the exchange rate during the time the BCRP is active in the forex and during the 
time the BCRP has committed to not participate in the market. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that the BCRP’s past information on interventions 
has been successful in causing the market to expect the sol to move in the desired direction, 
but only during the time the BCRP is active in the forex. Thus, market expectations about the 
future exchange rate at other times of the day were not favorable, as the market might have 
expected  that  the  exchange  rate  will  move  in  the  opposite  direction  of  what  the  past 
intervention policy intends. But making past BCRP participation in the forex publicly known 
does not have any effect on the volatility of the sol at any time of the day. 
Expectations of future interventions do not move the exchange rate along the intended 
path,  and  may  even  cause  some  excess  volatility  of  the  sol,  especially  when  the  sol 
depreciates against the USD. One could, of course, appeal to the work of Morris and Shin 
(2006), who demonstrate that even when information (e.g., about past interventions) becomes 
common knowledge, asymmetric informational problems may result in coordination failures. 
Thus, public information regarding past interventions can easily be interpreted differently by 
each market participant and fail to coordinate what public information really means. Such a 
theory could explain why the future expected BCRP activities are not always successful in 
decreasing volatility and moving the exchange rate in the right direction.  
By modeling the conditional volatility of the sol/USD as an EGARCH (1,1) process, 
we find evidence that there are asymmetric responses of volatility to positive and negative 
shocks.     
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As a final recommendation, the BCRP should try to address the problem of large bid-
ask  spreads.  Further  research  should  investigate  whether  interventions  affect  the  bid-ask 
spread, and even whether the volatility of the exchange rate affects such spread. This is very 
important  for  participants  in  foreign  trade  and  investment  who  are  involved  in  foreign 
exchange transactions in general. 
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